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Illiquidity and Derivative Valuation







In illiquid markets, option traders may have an incentive to increase their portfolio value
by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. We provide a mathematical frame-
work within which to value derivatives under market impact in a multi-player framework by
introducing strategic interactions into the model of Almgren and Chriss (2001). Specically,
we consider a nancial market model with several strategically interacting players that hold
European contingent claims and whose trading decisions have an impact on the price evolution
of the underlying. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results for risk neutral
and CARA investors and show that the equilibrium dynamics can be characterized in terms
of a coupled system of possibly non-linear PDEs. For the linear cost function used in Almgren
and Chriss (2001), we obtain a (semi) closed form solution. Analyzing this solution, we show
how market manipulation can be reduced.
AMS classication: 91B28, 91B70, 60K10
JEL classication: C73, G12, G13
Keywords: Stochastic dierential games, illiquidity, market impact, derivative valuation.
1 Introduction
Standard nancial market models assume that asset prices follow an exogenous stochastic process
and that all transactions can be settled at the prevailing price without any impact on market
dynamics. The assumption that all trades can be carried out at exogenously given prices is
∗We thank Torsten Schöneborn, Mikhail Urusov, seminar participants at various institutions and two anonymous
referees for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial Support through the SFB 649 Economic Risk is
gratefully acknowledged.
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appropriate for small investors that trade only a negligible proportion of the overall daily trading
volume; it is not appropriate for institutional investors trading large blocks of shares over a short
time span. Trading large amounts of shares is likely to move stock prices in an unfavorable direction
and often carries signicant trading costs. This is a particular challenge for traders that need to
liquidate or acquire large portfolios. In derivative markets the situation is more ambiguous. A
trader that is endowed with a large number of options may have an incentive to utilize her impact
on the price dynamics of the underlying in order to move the option value in a favorable direction1.
Pirrong (2001) write that a trader with a large long position in a cash-settled contract can drive up
its settlement value by buying excessive quantities [of the underlying]. Kumar and Seppi (1992)
call such trading behavior punching the close. This paper addresses the problem of derivative
valuation in nancial markets with strategically interacting investors that have an incentive to
punch the close. We model the interaction between the investors as a stochastic dierential game
and establish existence and uniqueness of Markov equilibria for risk neutral and CARA investors.
This allows us to discuss some ideas how manipulation in the sense of punching the close can
possibly be avoided.
Our work builds on previous research in at least three dierent elds. The rst is the mathe-
matical modeling of illiquid nancial markets. The last few years the role of liquidity as a source
of nancial risk has been extensively investigated in both the mathematical nance and nancial
economics literature. Much of the literature focusses on either optimal hedging and portfolio liq-
uidation strategies for a single large investor under market impact (Çetin, Jarrow, and Protter
(2004), Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied (2010), Rogers and Singh (2008)), predatory trading (Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2005), Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007), Schied and Schöneborn
(2007)) or the role of derivative securities including the problem of market manipulation using
options (Jarrow (1994), Kumar and Seppi (1992)). It has been shown by Jarrow (1994), for
instance, that by introducing derivatives into an otherwise complete and arbitrage-free market,
certain manipulation strategies for a large trader may appear, such as market corners and front
runs. Schönbucher and Wilmott (2000) discuss an illiquid market model where a large trader can
inuence the stock price with vanishing costs and risk. They argue that the risk of manipulation
on the part of the large trader makes the small traders unwilling to trade derivatives any more. In
particular, they predict that the option market breaks down. Our analysis indicates that markets
do not necessarily break down when stock price manipulation is costly as it is in our model. Kraft
and Kühn (2009) analyze the behaviour of an investor in a Black Scholes type market, where
trading has a linear permanent impact on the stock's drift. They construct the hedging strategy
and the indierence price of a European payo for a CARA investor, and show that the optimal
strategy is a combination of hedging and manipulation. In order to exploit her market impact,
the investor over- or underhedges the option, depending on her endowment and the sign of the
impact term.
The second line of research our paper is connected to is the strategic interaction between
large investors and its implications for market microstructure, as discussed in Kyle (1985), Foster
1Gallmeyer and Seppi (2000) provide some evidence that in illiquid markets option traders are in fact able to
increase a derivative's value by moving the price of the underlying.
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and Viswanathan (1996), Back, Cao, and Willard (2000), and Chau and Vayanos (2008), for
instance. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) and Schied
and Schöneborn (2007) consider predatory trading, where liquidity providers try to benet from
the liquidity demand that comes from some large investor. Vanden (2005) considers a pricing
game in continuous time where the option issuer controls the volatility of the underlying but does
not incur liquidity or spread crossing costs. He derives a Nash equilibrium in the two player,
risk neutral case and shows that seemingly harmless derivatives, such as ordinary bull spreads,
oer incentives for manipulation that are identical to those oered by digital options (p. 1892, l.
36). Closest to our setup is the paper by Gallmeyer and Seppi (2000). They consider a binomial
model with three periods and nitely many risk neutral agents holding call options on an illiquid
underlying. Assuming a linear permanent price impact and linear transaction costs, and assuming
that all agents are initially endowed with the same derivative they prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium trading strategy and indicate how market manipulation can be reduced.
A third line of research we build on is market manipulation. Dierent notions of market
manipulations have been discussed in the literature including short squeezes, the use of private
information or false rumours, cf. Kyle (1985), Back (1992), Jarrow (1994), Allen and Gale (1992),
Pirrong (2001), Dutt and Harris (2005), Kyle and Viswanathan (2008). However, it seems to us
that no generally accepted denition of market manipulation has yet been established. Kyle and
Viswanathan (2008, p. 1) classify a trading strategy as illegal price manipulation if it undermines
economic eciency both by making prices less accurate as signals for ecient resource allocation
and by making markets less liquid for risk transfer. Our notion of manipulation refers to the
practice of punching the close, i.e. moving the stock price in order to increase the payo of a
given option. Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) call strategies such as punching the close benign,
to emphasize that they are not necessarily illegal. Punching the close nonetheless reduces the
accuracy of prices as signals about a stock's fundamental value; we thus argue that it fullls at
least the rst part of Kyle and Viswanathan's denition of illegal manipulation.
Most of the aforementioned articles on manipulation are set up in discrete time. We suggest
a general mathematical framework in continuous time within which to value derivative securities
in illiquid markets under strategic interactions. Specically, we consider a pricing game between
a nite number of large investors (players) holding European claims written on an illiquid stock.
Their goal is to maximize expected utility at maturity from trading the stock where their portfolio
value at maturity depends on the trading strategies of all the other players through their impact on
the dynamics of the underlying. Following Almgren and Chriss (2001) we assume that the players
have a permanent impact on stock prices and that all trades are settled at the prevailing market
price plus a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium can be viewed as an instantaneous price
impact that aects transaction prices but not the value of the players' inventory. This form of
market impact modeling is analytically more tractable than that of Obizhaeva and Wang (2005)
which also allows for temporary price impacts and resilience eects. It has also been adopted
by, e.g. Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) and Schied and Schöneborn (2007) and some
practitioners from the nancial industry, as pointed out by Schied and Schöneborn (2008).
Our framework is exible enough to allow for rather general liquidity costs including the linear
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cost function of Almgren and Chriss (2001) and some form of spread crossing costs, cf. Example
2.4. We show that when the market participants are risk neutral or have CARA utility functions
the pricing game has a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of absolutely continuous Markovian
trading strategies; existence results for more general utility functions are given for the single player
case. We solve the problem of equilibrium pricing using techniques from the theory of stochastic
optimal control and stochastic dierential games. Assuming that players' action sets are given
by a class of absolutely continuous Markovian trading strategies we show that the family of the
players' value functions can be characterized as the solution to a coupled system of non-linear
PDEs. Coupled systems of non-linear PDEs arise naturally in dierential stochastic games. Since
general existence and uniqueness of solution results for systems of non-linear PDEs on unbounded
state spaces are unavailable much of the literature on stochastic dierential games is conned to
bounded state spaces; see. e.g., the seminal paper of Friedman (1972). Without a priori estimates
it is usually hard to prove the existence of a global solution to a non-linear PDE system. We prove
an a priori estimate Nash equilibria. More precisely we prove that under rather mild conditions
any equilibrium trading strategy is uniformly bounded. This allows us to prove that the PDE
system that describes the equilibrium dynamics has a unique classical solution. The equilibrium
problem can be solved in closed form for a specic market environment, namely the linear cost
structure used in Almgren and Chriss (2001) and risk neutral agents.
It is important to know which measures may reduce market manipulation. For instance, Dutt
and Harris (2005) propose position limits; Pirrong (2001) suggests ecient contract designs. We
use the explicit solution for risk neutral investors to show when punching the close is not bene-
cial. For instance, no manipulation occurs in zero sum games, i.e., in a game between an option
writer and an option issuer. In our model manipulation decreases with the number of informed
liquidity providers and with the number of competitors, if the product is split between them. Fur-
thermore, we nd that the bid ask spread is important determinant of market manipulation. It
turns out that the higher the spread, the less benecial market manipulation: high spread crossing
costs make trading more costly and hence discourage frequent re-balancing of portfolio positions.
This paper is organized as follows: We present the market model in section 2. In section 3, we
formulate the optimization problem, derive a priori estimates for Nash equilibria and prove the
existence of a solution for one player with general utility function. We solve the multi-player case
in section 4 for risk neutral and CARA agents. We use these solutions in section 5 to show how
market manipulation can be reduced. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We adopt the market impact model of Schied and Schöneborn (2007) with a nite set of agents,
or players, trading a single stock whose price process depends on the agents' trading strategies.
Following Almgren and Chriss (2001) we shall assume that the players have a permanent impact
on asset prices and that all trades are settled at prevailing market prices plus a liquidity premium
which depends on the change in the players' portfolios. In order to be able to capture changes
in portfolio positions in an analytically tractable way, we follow Almgren and Chriss (2001) and
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Schied and Schöneborn (2007) and restrict ourselves to absolutely continuous Markov trading
strategies. A Markov trading strategy for player j ∈ J , {1, ..., N} is a family of mappings
Xjt : R → R for any time t ∈ [0, T ] where X
j
t (p) denotes the number of stock shares the player
holds at time t, given the stock current price is p. We assume that the strategy Xj belongs to the
class
X , {X : [0, T ]×R 7→ R|X absolutely continuous adapted and X0 = 0} ,
write dXjt = Ẋ
j
t dt and call Ẋ
j the trading speed of player j.
Remark 2.1. We appreciate that it may be considered undesirable to allow for absolutely contin-
uous strategies only. Jumps are naturally captured in discrete time models, such as Kumar and
Seppi (1992) or Gallmeyer and Seppi (2000). However, strategies with absolutely continuous and
jump parts in continuous time would call for methods of singular or impulse control, viscosity so-
lutions, and (systems of) quasi variational inequalities. This is beyond the scope of this article;
we refer the interested reader to Ly Vath, Mnif, and Pham (2007) and Guo and Pham (2005) for
a discussion of investment problems with more general trading strategies. 
2.1 Price dynamics and the liquidity premium
Our focus is on valuation schemes for derivatives with short maturities under strategic market
interactions. For short trading periods it is appropriate to model the fundamental stock price, i.e.,
the value of the stock in the absence of any market impact, as a Brownian Motion with volatility
(σBt). Market impact is accounted for by assuming that the investors' accumulated stock holdings∑N
i=1X
i have a linear impact on the stock process (Pt) so that




with a permanent impact parameter λ > 0. The linear permanent impact is consistent with the
work of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) who argue that linearity of the permanent price impact is
important to exclude quasi-arbitrage.
A trade at time t ∈ [0, T ] is settled at a transaction price P̃t that includes an additional
instantaneous price impact, or liquidity premium. Specically,







with a cost function g that depends on the instantaneous change
∑N
i=1 Ẋ
i in the agents' position
in a possibly non-linear manner. The liquidity premium accounts for limited available liquidity,
transaction costs, fees or spread crossing costs, cf. Example 2.4. Spread-crossing costs are of
particular importance and have not been considered in the previous literature on market impact.
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Remark 2.2. In our model the liquidity costs are the same for all traders and depend only on the
aggregate demand throughout the entire set of agents. This captures situations where the agents
trade through a market maker or clearing house that reduces the trading costs by collecting all orders






We assume with no loss of generality that g is normalized, g(0) = 0, and that g is smooth. The
following additional mild assumptions on g will guarantee that the equilibrium pricing problem
has a solution for risk neutral and CARA investors.
Assumption 2.3. • The derivative g′ is bounded away from zero, that is g′ > ε > 0.
• The mapping z 7→ g(z) + zg′(z) is strictly increasing.
The rst assumption is a technical condition needed in the proof of Proposition 3.2. It appears
not too restrictive for a cost function. Since the liquidity costs associated with a net change in the
overall position z is given by zg(z), the second assumption states that the agents face increasing
marginal costs of trading. Our assumptions on g are satised for the following important examples:
Example 2.4. Among the cost functions which satisfy Assumption 2.3 are the linear cost function
g(z) = κz with κ > 0, used in Almgren and Chriss (2001) and cost functions of the form
g(z) = κz + s
2
π
arctan(Cz) with s, C > 0.
The former is the cost function associated with a block-shaped limit order book. The latter can
be viewed as a smooth approximation of the map z 7→ κz + s · sign(z) which is the cost function
associated with a block-shaped limit order book and bid ask spread s > 0.
2.2 Preferences and endowments
Each agent is initially endowed with a contingent claim Hj = Hj(PT ), whose payo depends on
the stock price PT at maturity. Our focus is on optimal trading strategies in the stock, given an
initial endowment. As in Gallmeyer and Seppi (2000) and Kraft and Kühn (2009), we assume
that the agents do not trade the option in [0, T ]. A consistent model for trading an illiquid option
with illiquid underlying in a multiplayer framework in continuous time is not available, to the
best of our knowledge. Our work might be considered a rst step in this direction. Although it
is not always necessary, we assume that the functions Hj are smooth and bounded with bounded
derivatives Hjp .
Remark 2.5. We only consider options with cash settlement. This assumption is key. While cash
settlement is susceptible to market manipulation, we show in Corollary 5.4 below that when deals
are settled physically, i.e., when the option issuer delivers the underlying, market manipulation is
not benecial: Any price increase is outweighed by the liquidity costs of subsequent liquidation. We
notice that this only applies to punching the close. There are other types of market manipulation,
such as corners and short squeezes, which might be benecial when deals are settled physically, but
which are not captured by our model, cf. Jarrow (1994) or Kyle and Viswanathan (2008). 
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If the agent j follows an absolutely continuous trading strategy Xj , then the value of her





plus the liquidation value LV j(XjT ) of the stock position X
j
T at maturity.
Remark 2.6. Dening and computing the liquidation value of an asset position in an illiquid
market is currently an active eld of research, cf. Almgren and Chriss (2001), Obizhaeva and
Wang (2005), Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied (2010) and Schied and Schöneborn (2008), to mention
only a few. For the special case of a single risk neutral investor the expected liquidation value
under innitely slow liquidation equals the expected trading costs in the absence of market impact















In particular, in optimizing her expected portfolio value the investor can focus entirely on the
tradeo between increased trading costs (market impact) and increased option payos. 
Rigorously dening a form of liquidation value in a game-theoretic setting is challenging, even
under risk neutrality. One reason is that all the agents optimize their trading rules against their
beliefs about the other players' assessments of all the portfolio values at maturity. In order to
simplify the analysis, and in order to focus on the interplay between the gain from manipulating
option payos and the increase in trading costs that accompanies it, we shall assume that all
agents value their portfolios according to its acquisition costs in the absence of market impact. Of
course, this is just a rst benchmark, but it nonetheless yields some insight into the structure of
optimal trading under strategic interactions. Without Assumption 2.7, the equilibrium analysis
becomes rather intractable as we illustrate in Appendix C.
Assumption 2.7. All agents optimize their utility assuming that for all j = 1, ..., N
























This optimization problem reects each investor's tradeo between high liquidity costs and an
increased option payo.2 If there is no market impact, agents do not trade, as we shall see in
Remark 3.1.




is a Nash equilibrium if for each
agent j ∈ J her trading strategy Ẋj is a best response against the behavior of all the other players,




2The only purpose of trading is an increased option payo and not, for instance, hedging. For a study on the
interplay of hedging and manipulation we refer the reader to Kraft and Kühn (2009).
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In the following section we derive a priori estimates for equilibrium trading strategies and use
standard results from the theory of stochastic optimization to show that Nash equilibria can be
characterized in terms of a coupled system of partial dierential equations (PDEs). For the special
case of risk neutral and CARA investors we show that the system of PDEs has a solution so that
a unique (in a certain class) equilibrium exists.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics and A-Priori Estimates
In this section we formulate the optimization problem (2.4) as a stochastic control problem, derive
the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-equations, HJB for short, and transform it into a system
of coupled PDEs. To this end, we choose the stock price P and the trading costs Rj of the agent
j ∈ J as state variables. They evolve according to:
dPt = σdBt + λ
N∑
i=1









dt, Rj0 = 0.





function of the player j, dened by

















| Pt = p
]
, (3.1)
denotes the maximal expected portfolio value at maturity that the player can achieve by trading
the underlying. The associated HJB-equation is (cf. Fleming and Soner (1993)):



















The HJB-equation is formulated in terms of the candidate value functions v1, ..., vN instead of
the actual value functions V 1, ..., V N . We rst need to show existence and uniqueness of a smooth
solution to (3.2) before we can identify vi with V i. Given the aggregate trading strategy Ẋ−j of
all the other agents, a candidate for the maximizer cj = Ẋj in (3.2) should satisfy

















Under some mild technical assumption which will all be satised for the case of risk neutral and
CARA investors studied in Section 4 we are now going to turn the individual HJB equations into
a coupled system of non-linear PDE. In terms of this PDE system we shall then characterize a
class of equilibrium trading strategies.
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3.1 The equilibrium PDE system






i,j∈J is invertible for any xed argument (t, p, r). We











i,j∈J is invertible, there exist δ






= 1 for each j ∈ J . Thus, multiplying equation (3.3) with δj and summing

























































≥ 1. Again, this is true for risk neutral and CARA
investors, where δjvj
rj
= 1. Due to Assumption 2.3, z 7→ K · g(z) + z · g′(z) is strictly increasing.











jvjrj . Plugging the solution Ẋ















) [λvjp + g(Ẋ∗)vjrj] . (3.5)
This expression is well dened since g′ > 0. To conclude, we have turned the family of individual
HJB-equations (3.2) into the following system of coupled PDEs for j = 1, ..., N :


















where the coupling stems from Ẋ∗, which is uniquely dened via (3.4). It will become clear in
Section 4 that the state variable r is redundant for risk neutral and CARA investors. In these
cases, the value function is translation invariant (after a suitable transformation), which allows to
drop the variable r.
Remark 3.1. In a market without price impact (λ = 0), manipulation is not benecial. To
see this, rst note that Ẋ∗ =
∑N
i=1 Ẋ









, and in particular vj
rj
6= 0 and vj
ri






and nally Ẋj = 0 for each j. 
9
3.2 A priori equilibrium estimate







along with the implicit dependence of Ẋ∗ on the derivatives vip
and vi
ri
, i ∈ J . In Section 4, we show that a unique classical solution to the system (3.6) exists
for risk neutral and CARA investors. The proof uses the following a priori estimates for the
optimal trading strategies. It states that, if an equilibrium exists, then each player's trading speed
is bounded. In particular, there is no equilibrium with unbounded strategies. As a result, the
agents' utilities from trading and the value function associated with their respective HJB equations





be a Nash equilibrium for problem (2.4). Then each strategy




∥∥H ip∥∥∞ + 1) ,
where ε is taken from Assumption 2.3.
Proof. Let j ∈ J , h , maxi
∥∥H ip∥∥∞ and A , {(t, ω) : ∑Ni=1 Ẋit(t, ω) ≥ 0} be the set where the
aggregate trading speed is nonnegative. Let us x the sum of the competitors' strategies Ẋ−j . On
the set A the best response Ẋjt is bounded from above by K ,
λ
ε (h+ 1). Otherwise the truncated
strategy Ẏ jt , Ẋ
j
t ∧K 1A + Ẋ
j
t 1Ac would outperform Ẋ
j
t . To see this, let us compare the payos




T the stock price under the strategies Ẏ
j
and Ẋj , respectively. The payo associated with Ẏ j minus the payo associated with Ẋj can be























































dt− λ(XjT − Y
j
T ) ‖Hp‖∞ .
Note that Ẋjt + Ẋ
−j

























, again by Assumption 2.3. The dierence in the





































we have Ẏ jt = K =
λ
ε (h+ 1) and the above expression is strictly positive,
a contradiction. This shows that Ẋjt is bounded above by K on the set A for each j ∈ J . Still on







−Ẋit ≥ 0− (N − 1)K. (3.7)






t(t, ω) ≤ 0
}
completes the proof.
In the one player framework we can use a standard result from the theory of stochastic control
to show that (3.6) admits a unique solution. We say that a function ψ satises a polynomial
growth condition if there are constants p, C > 0 such that |ψ(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|p).
Proposition 3.3. Let N = 1. Let u ∈ C 3 be such that u and u′ satisfy a polynomial growth
condition. Then the HJB-equation (3.2) admits a unique classical solution in C 1,2, which coincides
with the value function V .
Proof. Due to the a priori estimates in Proposition 3.2, it is enough to choose the control Ẋ from
a compact set. Thus, we can apply Theorem IV.4.3 in Fleming and Soner (1993), which yields
that (3.2) admits a unique solution in C 1,2, which is of polynomial growth. It remains to apply
the Verication Theorem IV.3.1 from Fleming and Soner (1993) to see that this solution coincides
with the agent's value function V .
Under suitable smoothness conditions on the cost function the PDE system (3.6) always has
a bounded solution with bounded derivatives for small time steps; see Taylor (1997), Proposition
15.1.1. The challenge is to establish a global solution, i.e., a solution on the whole time interval
[0, T ]. The main diculty stems from the dependence of the players' optimal trading strategies
on the derivative of the value function with respect to the trading costs. If the derivatives vj
ri
are
constant, then our a priori estimate together with the boundedness assumptions on the payos
Hj and the characterization (3.5) of the equilibrium aggregate trading speed guarantees that the
value function are bounded with bounded derivatives and hence that an equilibrium exists. This
argument will be made more precise in the following section.
4 Solution for Risk Neutral and CARA Investors
In this section we establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results for risk neutral and
CARA investors. For risk neutral investors and linear cost functions the equilibrium strategies can
be given in closed form; if spread crossing costs are involved a closed form solution is not available
and we report numerical results instead.
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4.1 Risk Neutral Agents
Let us assume that all players are risk neutral, i.e. uj(z) = z. In a rst step we prove existence of
a unique solution to the system (3.6) for general cost functions g. Subsequently we construct an
explicit solution to (3.6) for the linear cost structure used in Almgren and Chriss (2001).
4.1.1 General Cost Structure
Let g be a general cost function which satises Assumption 2.3. In the risk neutral case the value
function of player j turns into













ds+Hj(PT )|Pt = p
]
.
In particular, V j
ri
= −1i=j and the optimal strategies do not depend on the trading costs. In other
words, the state variable r is redundant and we omit it in this section. We write
V j(t, p) , V j(t, p, 0),
and call this function value function, if there is no danger of confusion. The HJB-equation (3.2)
turns into















where we have used V j
ri
= −1i=j . The optimal trading speed from (3.5) is given by




) [−λvjp + g(Ẋ∗)] (4.2)
where the aggregate trading speed Ẋ∗ =
∑N
i=1 Ẋ























This is (3.4) with δj = −1. The system of PDEs (3.6) therefore takes the form













with terminal condition vj(T, p) = Hj(p) for j ∈ J . Systems of the form (4.4) appear naturally in
the theory of dierential games, but we did not nd a reference which covers this particular case.
Theorem 1 of Friedman (1972) for instance is valid only on a bounded state space. However, in
view of our a-priori estimates of Proposition 3.2 the proof follows from a general existence result
for nonlinear systems of PDEs stated in Appendix A. The following theorem shows that a unique
solution exists if Hj ∈ C 2b , i.e. Hj and its derivatives up to order 2 are bounded for each j.
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Theorem 4.1. Let H ∈ C 2b . Then the Cauchy problem (4.4) admits a unique classical solution
in C 1,2, which coincides with the vector of value functions.
An alternative way of solving the system (4.4) is the following: If we sum up the N equations,














with terminal condition v(T, p) =
∑N
i=1H
i(p). Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this
one-dimensional problem can be shown using Theorem IV.8.1 in Ladyzenskaja, Solonnikov, and
Ural'ceva (1968). Once the solution is known, we can plug it back into (4.4) and get N decoupled
equations. This technique is applied in the following section where we construct an explicit solution
for linear cost functions.
4.1.2 Linear Cost Structure
For the particular choice g(z) = κz (κ > 0) used in Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Schied and
Schöneborn (2007), the solution to (4.4) can be given explicitly.
Corollary 4.2. Let g(z) = κz. Then the solution of (4.4) can be given in closed form as the
solution to a nonhomogeneous heat equation.





































with terminal condition v(T, p) =
∑N
i=1H
i(p). This PDE is a variant of Burgers' equation, cf.
Rosencrans (1972). It allows for an explicit solution, which we cite in Lemma 4.3. With this
solution at hand, we can solve for each single investor's value function. We plug the solution v
back into the equations (4.6) and (4.7) for the trading speeds, and those into the PDE (4.4). This
yields







with terminal condition vj(T, p) = Hj(p). This nonhomogeneous heat equation is solved by
vj(T − t, p) =
∫
R







v2p(s, ·)dN (p, σ(t− s))
where v is given in Lemma 4.3 and N denotes the heat kernel.
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In the preceding proof and in Corollary 4.5 we need the solution to a variant of Burgers'
equation. We cite it in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let A > 0, B 6= 0 and G : R→ R be smooth and bounded. The PDE
0 = 2vt +Avpp +Bv2p
with terminal value




















, T − t
)]
.
Proof. By means of a linear transformation we can reduce the problem to A = B = 1. This
particular case is solved in Rosencrans (1972).
4.1.3 Numerical Illustrations
In the risk neutral setting, we were able to reduce the system of PDEs from the multi-player setting
to the one-dimensional PDE (4.8) for the aggregate value function. This can be interpreted as the
value function of the representative agent. Such reduction to a representative agent is not always
possible for more general utility functions. In the sequel we illustrate the optimal trading speed
Ẋ(t, p) and surplus of a representative agent as functions of time and spot prices for a European
call option H(PT ) = (PT −K)+ and digital option H(PT ) = 1{PT≥K}, respectively.
3 By surplus,
we mean the dierence between the representative agent's optimal expected utility v(t, p) and the
conditional expected payo Et[H(PT )|Pt = p] in the absence of any market impact. It represents
the expected net benet due to price manipulation.
We choose a linear cost function, strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility σ = 1 and liquidity
parameters λ = κ = 0.01. We see from Figure 1 that for the case of a call option both the optimal
trading speed and the surplus increases with the spot; the latter also increases with the time to
maturity. Furthermore, the increase in the trading speed is maximal when the option is at the
money. For digital options the trading speed is highest for at the money options close to maturity
as the trader tries to push the spot above the strike. If the spot is far away from the strike, the
trading speed is very small as it is unlikely that the trader can push the spot above the strike
before expiry.
3Note that the cost function in (4.9) is not smooth, and the Call and Digital options are not smooth and
bounded, so Theorem 4.1 does not apply directly. There are two ways to overcome this diculty: We could either
approximate g and H by smooth and bounded functions. Or we could interpret v not as a classical, but only as a



























































Figure 2: Trading speed and surplus for one risk neutral investor holding a Digital option.
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Trading Speed at t=0








Figure 3: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a European Call option for dierent
spread sizes s = 0 (black), 0.001 (blue), 0.002 (red), 0.003 (green), 0.004 (brown). The higher the spread,
the smaller the trading speed and the surplus.






Trading Speed at t=0








Figure 4: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a Digital option for dierent spread
sizes s = 0 (black), 0.001 (blue), 0.002 (red), 0.003 (green), 0.004 (brown). The higher the spread, the
smaller the trading speed and the surplus.
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that a high spread makes manipulation unattractive. It shows the
optimal trading speed and the surplus at time t = 0 for the Call and Digital option in the one
player framework. We used the cost function
g(z) = κz + s · sign(z) for dierent spreads s ∈ {0, 0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004} (4.9)
with the remaining parameters as above. We see that the higher the spread, the smaller the
trading speed and the surplus. This is intuitive as frequent trading, in particular, when the option
is at the money, incurs high spread crossing costs. The same is true for xed transaction costs
which also discourage frequent trading.
4.2 Risk Averse Agents





for j = 1, ..., N , where αj > 0 is the risk aversion coecient. In this case the
value functions satisfy




· V j(t, p, 0)
and thus V j
ri
= αjV j1i=j . We suppress the state variable r and write V j(t, p) , V j(t, p, 0). As
above, we rst show existence and uniqueness of a solution for a general cost structure. In a second
step, we derive the closed form solution for the linear cost function in the single player framework.
4.2.1 General Cost Structure
The HJB-equation (3.2) turns into






















. We apply the logarithmic transformation
ṽj , − 1
αj
log(−vj) to turn the HJB equation into





















with terminal condition ṽj(T, p) = Hj(p). Note that this equation equals the HJB-equation (4.1)





. As in (4.2), the optimal
trading speeds are




) [−λṽjp + g(Ẋ∗)]
























If we plug Ẋ∗ and Ẋj back into (4.11), we get
















We can show existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Theorem 4.4. Let Hj ∈ C 2b for each j ∈ J . The Cauchy problem (4.11) admits a unique solution,
which coincides with the vector of value functions (up to an exponential transformation).
Proof. See appendix A.
4.2.2 Linear Cost Structure, Single Player
For the one player case with linear cost structure, we have an explicit solution:
Corollary 4.5. Let N = 1 and g(z) = κz. Then the Cauchy problem (4.11) admits a unique
solution, which can be given in closed form.
Proof. The maximizer in (4.11) is




and the Cauchy problem (4.13) turns into












with terminal condition ṽ(T, p) = H(p). This is Burgers' equation. Its explicit solution is given
in Lemma 4.3.
4.2.3 Numerical Illustrations
Let us conclude this section with numerical illustrations. We simulated the system (4.10) for
two players. Figure 5 shows the aggregate optimal trading speed and the surpluses vj(0, p) −
E
[
uj (H(PT )) |P0 = p
]
for time t = 0 and dierent spot prices p ∈ [95, 105] for the European
Call option H(PT ) = (PT −K)+; we assume that Player 1 (blue) is the option writer and Player
2 (red) the option issuer. We chose the strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility σ = 2 and
liquidity parameters λ = κ = 0.01 and risk aversion parameters α1 = 0.01, α2 = 0.01 (solid),
respectively, α1 = 0.001, α2 = 0.1 (dashed). Since Player 1 has a long position in the option, she
has an incentive to buy the underlying; for the same reason Players 2 has an incentive to sell it
(Panel (b)). Our simulations suggest that the dependence of the equilibrium trading speed on the
agents' risk aversion is weak (Panels (b) and (c)) and that overall the option issuer is slightly more
active than the option writer. Furthermore, we see from Panel (d) that the issuer benets more
from reducing her loss than the writer benets from increasing her gains. This eect is due to the
concavity of the utility function and increases with the risk aversion.
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Value Function at t=0
(a)






Trading Speed at t=0
(b)









Cumulated Trading Speed at t=0
(c)






Figure 5: Value function, trading speed, aggregate trading speed and surplus for the writer (blue) and
issuer (red) of a European Call option when both agents are risk averse. The solid (dashed) curves display
the case where issuer is about as (more) risk averse than the option writer.
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5 How to Avoid Manipulation
In the absence of market impact, manipulation does not occur, as we saw in Remark 3.1. In this
section, we use the closed form solutions for risk neutral agents derived in subsection 4.1.2 to
illustrate how an option issuer may prevent4 other market participants from trading against her
by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. Some of our observations were already
made in Kumar and Seppi (1992) for Futures in a two period model and in Gallmeyer and Seppi
(2000) for Call options in a three period binomial model. We start with the simplest case of a
zero-sum game.
Corollary 5.1. Let all players be risk neutral with osetting payos
∑N
i=1H
i = 0. Then the




Proof. Consider the PDE (4.5) for the aggregate value function with terminal condition zero and
the characterization (4.3) of the aggregate trading speed. Ẋ∗ =
∑N
i=1 Ẋ




is the unique solution to this coupled system.
In a zero-sum game, if all option traders are risk neutral and willing to move the market in
their favor, their combined eect cancels. We note that this is no longer true for general utility
functions, as illustrated in gure 5 for the CARA case.
In reality, some (or all) of the investors might not want to manipulate, e.g. for legal reasons5.
This is why we now look at the following asymmetric situation: The option issuer, Player 0,
does not trade the underlying; her competitor, Player 1, owns the payo H1 6= 0 and intends to
move the stock price to her favor. In addition, there are N − 1 informed investors without option
endowment in the market. They are predators that may supply liquidity and thus reduce the rst
player's market impact, cf. Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) and Schied and Schöneborn
(2007). Note that Corollaries 5.3 and 5.2 are only valid for the linear cost function, as the proofs
hinge on the closed form solution obtained in Corollary 4.2. The following result states that the
aggregate trading speed is decreasing in the number of players. The more liquidity suppliers, the
less market manipulation. If the number of players goes to innity, manipulation vanishes.
Corollary 5.2. Let g(z) = κz. Let H1 ∈ C 2b be nondecreasing and H i = 0 for i = 2, ..., N . Then










Proof. See appendix B.
4Let us emphasize again that our results only apply to the practice of punching the close, i.e. manipulating the
stock price in order to increase a given option payo. There are other types of market manipulation not covered
by our setup, such as market corners, short squeezes, the use of private information or false rumours. We refer the
interested reader to Jarrow (1994) and Kyle and Viswanathan (2008).
5A discussion of legal issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but see the discussion in Kyle and Viswanathan
(2008)
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cumulated Trading Speed at t=0
(a) Call






cumulated Trading Speed at t=0
(b) Digital
Figure 6: Aggregate trading speed Ẋ∗ at time t = 0 for N = 1 (black), 10 (blue), 100 (red) players each
holding 1/N shares of a Call (left) and Digital (right) option with strike K = 100. The more agents, the
less aggregate manipulation.
Let us modify the preceding setting a little. Again, Player 0 issues a product H and does not
intend to manipulate the underlying, while her competitors do. More precisely, assume that player
0 splits the product H into pieces and sells them to N risk neutral competitors, such that each of
them gets 1NH. We nd that their aggregate trading speed
∑N
i=1 Ẋ
i is decreasing in the number
of competitors N . Consequently, the option issuer should sell her product to as many investors as
possible in order to avoid being outsmarted. We illustrate this result in gure 6, which shows the
aggregate trading speed at time t = 0 of N players each holding 1/N option shares.
Corollary 5.3. Let g(z) = κz. Let H ∈ C 2b be nondecreasing and H i =
1
NH for i = 1, ..., N .










Proof. See appendix B.
The preceding results indicate how an option issuer can prevent her competitors from manip-
ulation. One strategy is public announcement of the transaction: the more informed liquidity
suppliers on the market, the smaller the impact on the underlying. A second strategy is split-
ting the product into pieces - the more option writers, the less manipulation. Let us conclude
this section with a surprisingly simple way to avoid manipulation: using options with physical
settlement.
Corollary 5.4. Calls, Puts and Forwards with physical settlement do not induce stock price ma-
nipulation.
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Proof. Consider a risk neutral agent who owns Θ > 0 Call options with physical settlement and
strike K. As above, we denote by X her strategy in the underlying. At maturity, she exercises















where the rst term represents the expected trading costs in [0, T ], the second term describes the
liquidation value of θ + XT stock shares in [T,∞) under innitely slow liquidation (cf. Almgren
and Chriss (2001)) and θK is the exercise price of θ Call options. Using (2.1), (2.2) and X0 = 0,














0 Ẋtg(Ẋt)dt is nonnegative, so the optimal trading strategy in the stock is clearly
Ẋ = 0. A similar argument holds true for Put options and Forward options with physical settle-
ment.
At rst glance, Corollary 5.4 might contradict Pirrong (2001, p.1). He states that replacement
of delivery settlement of futures contracts with cash settlement is frequently proposed to reduce
the frequency of market manipulation. While his notion of market manipulation refers to market
corners and short squeezes (see also Garbade and Silber (1983)), Corollary 5.4 shows that this
is not always true for manipulation strategies in the sense of punching the close. The heuristic
argument is the following: It is not benecial to drive up the stock price at maturity if the option
is settled physically and the investor needs to liquidate the stocks she receives at maturity. Any
price increase is outweighed by subsequent liquidation and has no positive eect, but it is costly.
This conrms a claim made in Kumar and Seppi (1992, p.1497), who argue that whether futures
contracts with a `physical delivery' option [are] also susceptible to liquidity-driven manipulation
[...] depends on whether `osetting' trades can be used to unwind a futures position with little
price impact.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the strategic behavior of option holders in illiquid markets. If trading the underly-
ing has a permanent impact on the stock price, the possession of derivatives with cash settlement
may induce market manipulation. We showed the existence and uniqueness of optimal trading
strategies in continuous time and for a general cost function; in the one player framework for
general utility functions, and in the multi-player case for risk neutral as well as CARA investors.
Moreover, we showed how market manipulation can be reduced.
Our work may be extended in several directions. Foremost, we derived our results under
Assumption 2.7. This assumption is only satised in the single-player risk-neutral case where the
expected costs of buying a portfolio over a nite time interval under market impact equals its
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expected liquidation value under innitely slow liquidation and does not hold in general. The
problem of dening a proper notion of liquidation value under strategic interaction is important
but was not our focus and is left for future research. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
consider American or path-dependent options, more sophisticated market impact models such
as Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) that account for resilience eects and, thirdly, trading strategies
which allow for jumps.
A An Existence Result
In this section, we prove Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 where the PDE (4.4) in the risk neutral setting
is a special case of the system (4.11) for risk averse agents, with αj = 0 for each j. In order to
establish our existence and uniqueness of equilibrium result, we adopt the proof of Proposition
15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) to our framework. After time inversion from t to T − t both systems of
PDEs are of the form














F 1, ..., FN
)
is of the form













Here Ẋ∗ = Ẋ∗(vp) is given implicitly by (4.3). The initial condition is





We rewrite (A.1) in terms of an integral equation as
v(t) = etL +
∫ t
0
e(t−s)LF (vp(s))ds , Ψv(t). (A.3)
and seek a xed point of the operator Ψ on the following set of functions:
X = C 1b (R,RN ) ,
{
v ∈ C 1(R,RN ) | v, vp bounded
}
equipped with the norm
‖v‖X , ‖v‖∞ + ‖vp‖∞ .
We set Y , Cb. Note that X and Y are Banach spaces and the semi-group etL associated with the
Laplace operator is strongly continuous on X, sends Y on X and satises∥∥etL∥∥
L (Y,X) ≤ Ct
−γ
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for some C > 0, γ < 1 and t ≤ 1. Furthermore, the nonlinearity F is locally Lipschitz and belongs
to C∞. Indeed, if we apply the implicit function theorem to Ẋ∗ given by (4.3), we see that the





(N + 1)g′(Ẋ∗(vp)) + Ẋ∗(vp)g′′(Ẋ∗(vp))
where the denominator is positive due to Assumption 2.3. The cost function g is C∞ by assump-
tion. In particular, the assumptions of Proposition 15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) are satised.
Before we proceed, we need the following lemma. It states that the value function6 satises∥∥V j∥∥X ≤ K for each j ∈ J and some constant K, so it suces to construct a solution in the
following set:
XK , {v ∈ X | ‖v‖X ≤ K} .
Lemma A.1. There is a constant K such that
∥∥V j∥∥X ≤ K for each j ∈ J .
Proof. We proof the assertion for risk neutral agents, the CARA case follows by the same argu-
ments. Our a priori estimates of Proposition 3.2 yield that Ẋj is bounded for each j ∈ J . By the
denition of V j(t, p) = V j(t, p, 0), we get that V j is bounded. Equation (3.5) implies that vjp is
bounded, since vj
ri
= −1i=j and Ẋj as well as Ẋ∗ are bounded.
We are now ready to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution to (A.3). In a nutshell, the
argument is the following: Using Proposition 15.1.1 in Taylor (1997), we construct a solution to
(A.1)-(A.2) for a small time horizon [0, τ ], with τ > 0 specied below. The vector v coincides with
the vector of value functions by Theorem IV.3.1 in Fleming and Soner (1993), so by Lemma A.1
the constructed solution is in XK . We apply his argument recursively to extend the solution to
[0, T ].
Proposition A.2. There is τ > 0 such that for each n ∈ N0, the PDE (A.3) with initial condition
(A.2) admits a unique classical, bounded solution in XK on the time horizon [0, nτ ∧ T ]. This
solution coincides with the value function.
Proof. 1. For n = 0, there is nothing to prove. Pick n ∈ N such that nτ < T . By induction,
we can assume that there is a solution v(n) ∈ XK on the time horizon [0, nτ ]. In particular,
the initial condition for the next recursion step h(n) , v(n)(nτ) is in XK .
2. Fix δ > 0. We construct a short time solution on the following set of functions:
Z(n+1) ,
{
v ∈ C ([nτ, (n+ 1)τ ],X) | v(nτ) = h(n),
∥∥∥v(t)− h(n)∥∥∥
X
≤ δ ∀t ∈ [nτ, (n+ 1)τ ]
}
.
We rst show that Ψ : Z(n+1) → Z(n+1) is a contraction, if τ > 0 is chosen small enough.
For this, let τ1 be small enough such that for t ≤ τ1 and any v ∈ XK we have∥∥etLv − v∥∥X ≤ 12δ.
6By value function, we mean the function V j(t, p) = V j(t, p, 0), where is state variable r is dropped.
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For v ∈ Z(n+1), the derivative vp is uniformly bounded in the sense ‖vp‖∞ ≤
∥∥h(n)∥∥X + δ ≤
K + δ. Hence, we only evaluate F on compact sets. By assumption, F is locally Lipschitz.
In particular, F is Lipschitz on compact sets. In other words, there is a constant K1 such
that for any v, w ∈ Z(n+1) we have
‖F (vp)− F (wp)‖Y ≤ K1 ‖v − w‖X
This implies, for w = h(n)
‖F (vp)‖Y ≤
∥∥∥F (h(n)p )∥∥∥Y +K1 ∥∥∥v − h(n)∥∥∥X
≤ K +K1δ , K2.


































This shows that Ψ maps Z(n+1) into itself.




















. This proofs that Ψ is a contraction
in Z(n+1), if τ is small in the sense
0 < τ , min{τ1, τ2, τ3}.
Note that the time step τ does not depend on n. It is the same in every recursion step.
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3. It follows that Ψ has a unique x point v in Z(n+1). In other words, we constructed a
function v ∈ C ([nτ, (n + 1)τ ],X) = C 0,1[nτ, (n + 1)τ ] which solves the PDE (A.3) with
initial condition v(s) = h(n) = v(n)(nτ) on the time interval [nτ, (n+ 1)τ ].
This solution is actually in C 1,2
(
(nτ, (n+ 1)τ ]× R,RN
)
, due to Proposition 15.1.2 in Taylor
(1997). Furthermore, v is bounded by construction. Indeed, ‖v‖∞ ≤
∥∥h(n)∥∥X + δ ≤ K + δ.
We dene the new solution as
v(n+1) , v(n)1{0≤t≤nτ} + v1{nτ<t≤(n+1)τ}.
By construction, v(n+1) solves (A.3) on the time horizon [0, (n+ 1)τ ] and is bounded and in
C 1,2. Hence, we can apply the Verication Theorem IV.3.1 from Fleming and Soner (1993),
which yields that v(n+1) coincides with the vector of value functions (up to time reversal,
reintroducing rj and an exponential transformation, if αj > 0). Due to Lemma A.1 we
have v(n+1) ∈ XK . In particular,
∥∥v(n+1)((n+ 1)τ)∥∥X ≤ K, which is necessary for the next
recursion step.
This completes the proof.
B Proof of Corollary 5.2 and Corollary 5.3
The argument is the same for both corollaries. Fix N ∈ N. The aggregate trading speed for N










where the aggregate value function v =
∑N
i=1 vi from (4.8) solves Burgers' equation









with terminal condition v(T, p) =
∑N
i=1H
i(p) = H1(p) , H(p). On the other hand, the aggregate










where the aggregate value function w =
∑N+1
i=1 wi solves









with terminal condition w(T, p) = H(p). We have to show that Ẋ∗ ≥ Ẏ ∗. To this end, let us
dene w̃ , N+1
(N+2)2
(N+1)2





by denition, 1N+1 w̃p ≥
1
N+2wp. This implies Ẋ
∗ ≥ Ẏ ∗.
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To show vp ≥ w̃p, rst note that w̃ is chosen such that it satises the same PDE (B.1) as v,
namely









with a smaller terminal condition: w̃(T, p) = N+1
(N+2)2
(N+1)2
N H(p) , (1− δ)H(p). The solutions to
(B.1) and (B.2) are given in Lemma 4.3 as
v(t, p) = c1 log
∫
R
exp (c2H(c3z)) dN (c4p, T − t)
and
w̃(t, p) = c1 log
∫
R
exp (c2(1− δ)H(c3z)) dN (c4p, T − t)









exp ((1− δ)G) dN (p, 1)


























under the measure Q with dQ , e(1−δ)GdN∫
e(1−δ)GdN
. The covariance of two increasing functions is surely
nonnegative. This nally proofs the assertion Ẋ∗ ≥ Ẏ ∗.























































































dN (0, T − t)
,
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where we used Lemma 4.3 in the second line. This expression is nonnegative, since Hp ≥ 0.













This completes the proof.
C The system of HJB PDEs without Assumption 2.7
In this section, we illustrate that the optimization problem under consideration becomes rather























where the rst term captures the trading costs (fundamental price plus liquidity costs) in [0, T ],
the second term represents the option payo and the third term the liquidation value of XjT stock
shares at maturity. The dynamics of the state variables are
dPt = σdBt + λ
N∑
i=1

















































with terminal condition vj(T, p, r, x) = uj
(
−rj +Hj(p) + LV j(xj)
)




denotes the opponents' aggregate trading speed. In this general formulation it is not clear that the
a priori estimates from Proposition 3.2 hold. Moreover, the PDE (C.1) is not uniformly parabolic,
so the proof of Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 given in Appendix A is not valid. In particular, we cannot
apply Proposition 15.1.2 of Taylor (1997).
References
Alfonsi, A., A. Fruth, and A. Schied (2010). Optimal execution strategies in limit order books
with general shape functions. Quantitative Finance 10 (2), 143157.
28
Allen, F. and D. Gale (1992). Stock-price manipulation. Review of Financial Studies 5, 503529.
Almgren, R. and N. Chriss (2001). Optimal execution of portfolio transactions. Journal of
Risk 3, 539.
Back, K. (1992). Insider trading in continuous time. Review of Financial Studies 5, 387410.
Back, K., H. Cao, and G. Willard (2000). Imperfect competition among informed traders.
Journal of Finance 55, 21172155.
Brunnermeier, M. and L. Pedersen (2005). Predatory trading. Journal of Finance 60 (4), 1825
1863.
Carlin, B. I., M. S. Lobo, and S. Viswanathan (2007). Episodic liquidity crises: Cooperative
and predatory trading. Journal of Finance 65 (5), 22352274.
Çetin, U., R. Jarrow, and P. Protter (2004). Liquidity risk and arbitrage pricing theory. Finance
and Stochastics 8 (3), 311341.
Chau, M. and D. Vayanos (2008). Strong-form eciency with monopolistic insiders. Review of
Financial Studies 21, 22752306.
Dutt, H. R. and L. E. Harris (2005). Position limits for cash-settled derivative contracts. Journal
of Futures Markets 25 (10), 945965.
Fleming, W. H. and H. M. Soner (1993). Controlled Markov Processes and Viscosity Solutions.
Springer Verlag, New York.
Foster, F. D. and S. Viswanathan (1996). Strategic trading with when agents forecast the
forecasts of others. Journal of Finance 51, 14371478.
Friedman, A. (1972). Stochastic dierential games. Journal of Dierential Equations 11, 79108.
Gallmeyer, M. and D. Seppi (2000). Derivative security induced price manipulation. Working
paper, Carnegie Mellon University.
Garbade, K. and W. Silber (1983). Cash settlement of futures contracts: An economic analysis.
Journal of Futures Markets 3, 451472.
Guo, X. and H. Pham (2005). Optimal partially reversible investment with entry decision and
general production function. Stochastic Processes and Applications 115, 705736.
Huberman, G. and W. Stanzl (2004). Price manipulation and quasi-arbitrage. Economet-
rica 72 (4), 12471275.
Jarrow, R. (1994). Derivative security markets, market manipulation, and option pricing theory.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29 (2), 241261.
Kraft, H. and C. Kühn (2009, October). Large traders and illiquid options: Hedging vs. manip-
ulation. Working Paper.
Kumar, P. and D. Seppi (1992). Futures manipulation with cash settlement. Journal of Fi-
nance 47 (4), 14851502.
29
Kyle, A. and S. Viswanathan (2008). How to dene illegal price manipulation. American Eco-
nomic Review 98, 274279.
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53 (6), 13151335.
Ladyzenskaja, O. A., V. A. Solonnikov, and N. N. Ural'ceva (1968). Linear and Quasi-linear
Equations of Parabolic Type. American Mathematical Society.
Ly Vath, V., M. Mnif, and H. Pham (2007). A model of optimal portfolio selection under
liquidity risk and price impact. Finance and Stochastics 11, 5190.
Obizhaeva, A. and J. Wang (2005). Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics.
Journal of Financial Markets. revised and resubmitted.
Pirrong, C. (2001). Manipulation of cash-settled futures contracts. Journal of Business 74 (2),
221244.
Rogers, L. C. G. and S. Singh (2008). The cost of illiquidity and its eects on hedging. to appear
in Mathematical Finance.
Rosencrans, S. (1972). Derivation of the hopf-cole solution to burgers' equation by stochastic
integrals. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc 32, 147149.
Schied, A. and T. Schöneborn (2007). Liquidation in the face of adversity: Stealth vs. sunshine
trading, predatory trading vs. liquidity provision. Working paper.
Schied, A. and T. Schöneborn (2008). Risk aversion and the dynamics of optimal liquidation
strategies in illiquid markets. Finance and Stochastics 13 (2), 181204.
Schönbucher, P. and P. Wilmott (2000). The feedback eect of hedging in illiquid markets.
SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 61, 232272.
Taylor, M. E. (1997). Partial Dierential Equations. III. Nonlinear Equations. Springer Verlag,
New York.







SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
001 "Volatility Investing with Variance Swaps" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle and 
Elena Silyakova, January 2010. 
002 "Partial Linear Quantile Regression and Bootstrap Confidence Bands" by 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Ya’acov Ritov and Song Song, January 2010. 
003  "Uniform confidence bands for pricing kernels" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
Yarema Okhrin and Weining Wang, January 2010. 
004 "Bayesian Inference in a Stochastic Volatility Nelson-Siegel Model" by 
Nikolaus Hautsch and Fuyu Yang, January 2010. 
005  "The Impact of Macroeconomic News on Quote Adjustments, Noise, and 
Informational Volatility" by Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess and David 
Veredas, January 2010. 
006 "Bayesian Estimation and Model Selection in the Generalised Stochastic 
Unit Root Model" by Fuyu Yang and Roberto Leon-Gonzalez, January 
2010. 
007 "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies" by Erik R. 
Fasten and Dirk Hofmann, January 2010. 
008 "Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic 
Complementarities" by Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniels and Frank 
Heinemann, January 2010. 
009 "Predicting extreme VaR: Nonparametric quantile regression with 
refinements from extreme value theory" by Julia Schaumburg, February 
2010. 
010 "On Securitization, Market Completion and Equilibrium Risk Transfer" by 
Ulrich Horst, Traian A. Pirvu and Gonçalo Dos Reis, February 2010.  
011 "Illiquidity and Derivative Valuation" by Ulrich Horst and Felix Naujokat, 
February 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
